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Abstract
We recently introduced a bounded rationality ap-
proach for the theory of desirable gambles. It is
based on the unique requirement that being non-
negative for a gamble has to be defined so that
it can be provable in polynomial-time. In this
paper we continue to investigate properties of
this class of models. In particular we verify that
the space of Bernstein polynomials in which non-
negativity is specified by the Krivine-Vasilescu
certificate is yet another instance of this theory.
As a consequence, we show how it is possible to
construct in it a thought experiment uncovering
entanglement with classical (hence non quantum)
coins.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper (Benavoli et al., 2019), we have shown
that Quantum Theory (QT) is a theory of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1957) based on a different notion
of nonnegativity. This is tantamount to change the
class of gambles that should always be desired in such
a way that the consistency problem becomes provable
in polynomial-time (we have called it P-coherence).
Conversely, in the same settings, classical probabil-
ity (standard “almost desirability” (Walley, 1991)) is
NP-hard. As a consequence, we have thence proved
that the only physics’ axiom in QT is computational
tractability, yielding all its weirdness (different logic
of events, negative probabilities, and entanglement).
Interestingly, it turns out that entanglement is
not peculiar to QT but an inherent characteristic
of bounded rationality for desirable gambles based
on P-coherence, a model first introduced in Benavoli
et al. (2017a) and implemented using sum-of-squares
polynomials in the real numbers.
A first goal of the present paper is to better un-
derstand the structural properties of P-coherence. An
elegant way of doing this is to look at the linear space
of gambles (L ) as an algebra of formulas, and thus
define a logic on it. In doing so, we verify that a suf-
ficient condition for the reduction of P-coherence to
classical logical consistency (that is the existence of
a non derivable formula from the considered set of
assessments) is for the set of tautologies to satisfy a
certain “pullup” property.
As a second goal of our work, we provide yet another
instance of a P-coherence model by using the so-called
Krivine-Vasilescu nonnegativity certificate for poly-
nomials. We show that, by focusing on polynomials
defined on the simplex of probability, this notion of non-
negativity defines the so-called Bernstein nonnegative
polynomials, a class whose cone, when polynomials are
of any degree d, has been introduced in De Cooman
et al. (2009) to generalise de Finetti’s representation
result for exchangeable events (see also (de Cooman
and Quaeghebeur, 2012; De Bock and De Cooman,
2012; De Cooman et al., 2015)).
Finally, we restrict our attention to a finite degree
d, compute the dual of a (Bernstein) P-coherent set
of desirable gambles and illustrate how P-coherence
can provide an example of entanglement with classical
coins: two coins that always land HH or TT, but for
which it is not possible to find a “common cause” (Ein-
stein et al., 1935) (a classical correlation model) that
explains these results. The latter is done by deriving
a Bell’s type inequality in the Bernstein’s world.
The title of this paper is freely inspired by Bell’s
work “Bertlmann’s socks and the nature of reality”
(Bell, 1981).
2. The logic of desirability
Let Ω denote the possibility space of an experiment
(e.g., {Head,Tail} or Rn). A gamble g on Ω is a
bounded real-valued function of Ω, interpreted as an
uncertain reward. Accepting a gamble g by an agent,
Alice, is regarded as a commitment to receive, or pay
(depending on the sign), g(ω) utiles1 whenever ω ∈ Ω
occurs. We denote by L the set of all the gambles
on Ω, the subset of all nonnegative gambles, that is,
1. Abstract units of utility, we can approximately identify it
with money provided we deal with small amounts of it (de
Finetti, 1974, Sec. 3.2.5)
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of gambles for which Alice is never expected to lose
utiles, is denoted as L≥ := {g ∈L : inf g ≥ 0} (analo-
gously negative gambles are denoted asL< := {g ∈L :
supg < 0}). In the following, with G ⊂L we denote a
finite set of gambles that Alice finds desirable (we will
comment on the case when G may not be finite): these
are the gambles that she is willing to accept and thus
commits herself to the corresponding transactions.
The crucial question is now to provide a criterion
for a set G of gambles representing assessments of
desirability to be called rational. Intuitively Alice is
rational if she avoids sure losses (also-called Dutch
books or arbitrages): that is, if, by considering the
implications of what she finds desirable, she is not
forced to find desirable a negative gamble. An elegant
way to formalise this intuition is to seeL as an algebra
of formulas, and thus define a logic on it. Based on it,
we can thus formulate rationality as logical consistency.
In the theory of (almost) desirable gambles, we may
proceed as follows. First of all we introduce some basic
notions from logic.
A sequent is a pair (G ,g), written G Bg, where G is
a set (possibly empty) of gambles, and g is a gamble.
One can read a sequent G Bg as saying “whenever
the gambles in G are desirable (accepted) for (by)
Alice, the gamble g is also desirable (accepted) for (by)
Alice”.
A Gentzen-style rule is a pair which consists of a
set {GiBgi | i≤ α} of sequents, called the premisses of
the rule, and a sequent G Bg, called the consequence
of the rule and therefore which follows from the set
according to the rule. We let α≤ ω, and thus do not
rule out the fact that a rule may be infinitary. A rule
r is written symbolically in the form
{GiBgi | i ∈ α}
(r) ,
G Bg
which can be read as “if Alice accepts the gamble gi,
given the fact that she accepts the gambles in Gi (for
i ∈ α), then necessarily whenever the gambles in G are
accepted, the gamble g is also accepted”.
An axiom is a rule in which the set of premisses is
empty.
A system S is a set of Gentzen-style rules. We say
that a sequent G Bg is provable in a system S from a
set of sequent {GiBgi | i≤α} if there is a well-founded
tree whose leaves are labelled either with axioms or
with members of {GiBgi | i≤α}, whose root is labelled
with G Bg and the labelling of all nodes is consistent
with the rules of S. A sequent is provable S if it is
provable from the empty set. The set of all gambles
g such that G Bg, for some set G , will sometimes be
denoted by CnS(G ). Finally, we say that a set G is
consistent in S if there is a gamble g such that G Bg
is not provable in S, that is
∃g ∈L such that g /∈ CnS(G ). (1)
A set G is closed in S whenever CnS(G ) = G , and is
called a theory of S. In general, theories are denoted
by K . When CnS is a consequence operator, that is
it is reflexive, monotone and transitive, the consistent
theories of S completely characterised it, in the sense
that CnS(G ) coincides with the intersection of all
consistent theories of S extending G .
The system T for the theory of (almost) desirable
gambles is thus defined as follows:
Structural axiom:
Reflexivity
(R) , for g ∈ G
G Bg
Logic axiom:
Accept. nonneg.
(ANN) , for g ∈L≥
G Bg
Logic rules:
Conic hull G Bg G
′Bf
(L) , for µ,λ≥ 0
G ,G ′Bµg+λf
Closure
{G Bg+ ` | ` > 0}
(C) , for  ∈ (0,1)
G Bg
It is easy to verify that CnT is indeed a consequence
operator on L , and thus in particular that the usual
structural rules of Gentzen systems such as weakening
and cut are derivable in T. It is immediate to verify
that logical consistency in T is indeed tantamount to
rationality (coherence, no arbitrage):
Theorem 1 Let G be a set of assessments. It holds
that CnT(G ) = cl(posi(G )), where posi denotes the
conic hull operators and cl the topological closure oper-
ator. Moreover the following conditions are equivalent
1. G is logically consistent in T
2. G avoids negativity (sure loss), that is L< ∩
CnT(G ) = ∅
3. −1 /∈ CnT(G ).
Therefore, −1 can be regarded as playing the role of
the (classical) Falsum.
Clearly when G is finite, CnT(G ) simply coincides
with the conic hull closure of G . From Theorem 1
we thence obtain that the principle of explosion is
derivable in T:
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G B−1
(Explosion) , for g ∈L .
G Bg
By observing that the mathematical dual of K is a
closed convex set of probabilities, we can then provide
a semantic (probabilistic interpretation) to T:
P(G ) =
{
µ ∈ S
∣∣∣∫
Ω
g(Ω)dµ(Ω)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ G
}
, (2)
where S = {µ∈M | inf µ≥ 0, ∫Ω dµ(Ω) = 1} is the set
of all probabilities in Ω, also-called (belief) states, and
M the set of all charges (a charge is a finitely additive
signed-measure (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Ch.11))
on Ω. The duality actually provides us immediately
with a sound and completeness results. Indeed, say
that a state µ ∈S is a model of a set of gambles G
whenever µ ∈P(G ). Then the following is an imme-
diate consequence of Theorem 1 and (Benavoli et al.,
2017b, Theorem 4).
Theorem 2 For every set of gambles G ∪{g} ⊆L ,
it holds that
g ∈ CnT(G ) ⇐⇒ P(g)⊆P(G ). (3)
In particular G is inconsistent iff P(G ) = ∅ (it has no
probabilistic model).
Hence, whenever an agent is coherent (that is the
rationality of her behaviour is represented by a logical
consistent theory in T), Equation (2) states that desir-
ability corresponds to nonnegative expectation (for all
probabilities in P). When she is incoherent, P turns
out to be empty.
Remark 3 In (1) we have defined the notion of logi-
cal consistency for a theory as being non trivial (differ-
ent from the whole language) and thus, from a seman-
tic perspective, as having a model (that is P is not
empty). Theorem 1 attests that −1 is tantamount to
the (classical) Falsum, that is an all implying formula
that has no model.
The importance of being able to reduce incoherence
to logical inconsistency can be appreciated by the fol-
lowing argument. Assume this is not the case, the
explosion principle for −1 does not hold. In particular,
this means that we may be able to find two different
incoherent sets of gambles (formulas). But then such
sets cannot be separated in the dual space, meaning
that duality would fail in providing us with a sound and
complete probabilistic semantics for the system under
consideration (that is satisfying the correspondence in
Equation (3) of Theorem 2).
The accent in this work to the capability of reduc-
ing coherence (also when formulated as P-coherence)
to logical consistency is therefore justified by the fact
that we do not want a situation of incoherence (irra-
tionality) to represent anything else than a situation
of incoherence (irrationality), and thus for which, seen
as a theory of a logic, there is no “natural” model (in
the dual space).
3. The complexity of inference
In light of Theorem 1, when the theory is finitely
generated, the problem of checking whether or not
K is consistent can be formulated as the following
decision problem:
∃λi ≥ 0 :−1−
|G |∑
i=1
λigi ∈L≥. (4)
If the answer is “yes”, then the gamble −1 belongs to
K , proving K ’s inconsistency. Actually any inference
task can ultimately be reduced to a problem of the
form (4): the lower prevision (expectation) of a gamble
q is E(q) = supλ0∈R,λi∈R≥ λ0 : q−λ0−
∑|G |
i=1λigi ∈
L≥. Hence, the above decision problem unveils a
crucial fact: the hardness of inference in classical prob-
ability corresponds to the hardness of evaluating the
nonnegativity of a function in the considered space
(the “nonnegativity decision problem”).
When Ω is infinite, and for generic functions, the non-
negativity decision problem is undecidable. To avoid
such an issue, we may impose restrictions on the class
of allowed gambles. For instance, instead of L , we
may consider LR: the class of multivariate polynomi-
als of degree at most d (we denote by L≥R ⊂LR the
subset of nonnegative polynomials and by L<R ⊂LR
the negative ones). In doing so, by Tarski-Seidenberg
quantifier elimination theory (Tarski, 1951; Seidenberg,
1954), the decision problem becomes decidable, but
still intractable, being in general NP-hard. If we accept
that P 6=NP and we require that inference should be
tractable (in P), we are stuck. What to do? A solution
is to change the meaning of “being nonnegative” for a
function by considering a subset Σ≥ (L≥R for which
the membership problem in (4) is in P.
In other words, a computationally efficient version
of TDG, which we denote by T?, should be based on
a redefinition of the logical axiom scheme , i.e., by
stating that
Accept. P-nonneg.
(P) , for g ∈ Σ≥.
G Bg
We thus denote by T? the Gentzen system (on LR)
obtaining from T by substituting (P) to (ANN), and
call it a P-system.
3
Benavoli Facchini Zaffalon
4. Coherence and semantics
4.1. P-coherence vs consistency
However, how can be sure that we have done things
properly, that T? is really just a computationally ef-
ficient version of T? In order to do so we would like
to verify that, for finite sets G , logical consistency can
be checked in polynomial-time by solving:
∃λi ≥ 0 such that −1−
|G |∑
i=1
λigi ∈ Σ≥. (5)
Note that, the lower prevision of a gamble q in this
case is
EB(q) = sup
λ0∈R,λi∈R≥
λ0
s.t.
q−λ0−
|G |∑
i=1
λigi ∈ Σ≥.
(6)
To verify that logical consistency can be checked in
polynomial-time, we need to find an analogous of The-
orem 1, but clearly also to assume that LR contains
all constant gambles.
In what follows, we provide some sufficient condi-
tions for this to hold. First of all, it is reasonable to
ask to the new variant of “being nonnegative” (that
is to the set Σ≥) to be a closed convex cone. Avoid-
ing nonnegativity (that is coherence, rationality, no
arbitrage) can now be redefined as follows
Definition 4 (P-coherence) A set C ⊆LR is P-
coherent if Σ< ∩C = ∅, where Σ< is the interior of
{g | −g ∈ Σ≥}.
From now on, we also always make another minimal
reasonable assumption of Σ< being non empty. The
next result states essentially that −1 represents P-
incoherence.
Proposition 5 Let G ⊆LR a set of assessments. It
holds that clposi(G ) = CnT?(G ). Moreover the follow-
ing are equivalent:
1. −1 /∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥)
2. posi(G ∪Σ≥) is P-coherent
3. CnT?(G ) is P-coherent
Analogously with T, one can ask whether the class
of P-coherent theories characterise the system T?. It
turns out that if we want to be sure this to be the
case (see Remark 3 for the reason why we want this)
we need to add some structure to Σ≥. For instance:
Proposition 6 Let G ⊆LR a set of assessments and
assume that
(pullup) for every f ∈LR, there is  > 0 such that
f +  ∈ Σ≥.
The following are then equivalent
1. CnT?(G ) is P-coherent
2. CnT?(G ) is logically consistent.
Hence, whenever (*) holds and Proposition 6 can be
applied, logical consistency in T? for finitely generated
theories can be checked efficiently. This is the case of
QT and of the family of P-systems defined on Bernstein
polynomials introduced in the following sections of this
work.
4.2. Probabilistic interpretation of P-systems
Interestingly, we can associate a “probabilistic” inter-
pretation as before to the system T? by computing the
dual of a theory. SinceLR is a topological vector space,
we can consider its dual spaceL ∗R of all bounded linear
functionals L :LR → R. Hence, with the additional
condition that linear functionals preserve the unitary
gamble, the dual cone of a theory C ⊂LR is given by
C ◦ = {L ∈L ∗R | L(g)≥ 0, L(1) = 1, ∀g ∈ C } . (7)
Based on Equation 7 and its properties, under the
pullup assumption one then gets the analogous of The-
orem 2 but for T?. The question now is whether we
can “massage” this result and obtain a sound and
complete classical probabilistic semantics. In this aim,
first notice that to C ◦ we can associate its extension
C • inM , that is, the set of all charges on Ω extending
an element in C ◦. However, as shown in (Benavoli
et al., 2019), in doing this one cannot in general pro-
vide an adequate classical probabilistic interpretations
to T?, except if one allow for instance the use of quasi-
probabilities (probability distributions that admit neg-
ative values). This is essentially due to the fact that
whenever Σ< (L<R , there are negative gambles that
cannot be proved to be negative in polynomial-time.
This observation (made mathematically precise in (Be-
navoli et al., 2019, Theorem 1)) provides for instances
an explanation of all paradoxes of quantum mechanics,
a special instance of a P-system.
5. Krivine-Vasilescu’s nonnegativity
Let LR be the space of all polynomials of n variables
of degree R in Ω.2 Let us assume that Ω⊂Rn is a com-
pact semi-algebraic set, i.e., a compact set described
2. The R in LR should stay for “Restricted”, here we also use
it to denote degree of the polynomial R.
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by polynomial inequalities
Ω = {x ∈ Rn : cj(x)≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m} . (8)
Let c¯j be equal to supx∈Ω cj(x), define
cˆj(x) =
{
cj(x)/c¯j if c¯j > 0,
cj(x) if c¯j = 0.
(9)
Therefore, it results that cˆj(x)≥ 0 and 1− cˆj(x)≥ 0
for each x ∈ Ω. Consider the closed convex cone
Σ≥d =
{ ∑
(α,β)∈N2m
d
uαβ cˆ
α1
1 · · · cˆαmm (1− cˆ1)β1 · · ·(1− cˆm)βm : uαβ ∈ R≥
}
,
(10)
where N2|c|d = {(α,β) ∈ N2|c| : |α+β| ≤ d} and |α| =∑m
i=1αi. We denote with R the maximum degree of
the polynomials in Σ≥d , so that Σ
≥
d ⊂LR.
Assumption 1 We assume that Σ≥d satisfies the
“pullup” property for every d ∈ N.
We can then define the Krivine-Vasilescu nonneg-
ativity certificate (Krivine, 1964; Vasilescu, 2003;
Lasserre, 2009).
Definition 7 (Krivine-Vasilescu) A polynomial of
g ∈LR is “nonnegative” in Ω when it belongs to Σ≥d
defined in (10).
That is, the function is “nonnegative” whenever the
coefficients uαβ are nonnegative.
Proposition 8 Given definition of Σ≥d in (10), the
consistency problem (5) can be solved in polynomial-
time
The proof is immediate and consists in showing that
the membership problem g ∈Σ≥d can be formulated as
a linear programming problem. We will give an example
of that in the next section. Let G be a finite set of
assessments, and C its deductive closure posi(G ∪Σ≥d ),
with the given definition Σ≥d in (10), satisfying −1 /∈C .
By Proposition 5 C is P-coherent, and therefore also
logical consistent.
Moreover, it is not difficult to prove that the dual
of C is
Q =
{
L ∈ S | L(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ G
}
, (11)
with the set of (belief) states defined as:
S =
{
L ∈L ∗R | L(1) = 1,
L(cˆα11 · · · cˆαmm (1− cˆ1)β1 · · ·(1− cˆm)βm)≥ 0,
∀ (α,β) ∈ N2|c|d
}
.
(12)
Note that, the linear operator acts on the monomi-
als (this follows by linearity) and, therefore, the dual
space is isomorphic to Rsn(d), with sn(d) being the
number of all monomials for a generic polynomial of
n variables and degree d. That means we can define
the real numbers
zγ1γ2...γn = L(x
γ1
1 x
γ2
2 · · ·xγnn ) ∈ R, (13)
with γi ∈ N, and we can rewrite L(f), for any polyno-
mial f ∈LR, as a function of the vector of variables
z ∈ Rsn(d), whose components are the real variables
zγ1γ2...γn defined above.
5.1. Simplex of probability
A particular case of the Krivine-Vasilescu’s nonnega-
tivity criterion is obtained when Ω is the probability
simplex:
Ω =
θ ∈ Rn : θj ≥ 0, 1−
n∑
j=1
θj ≥ 0
 , (14)
where the changed notation, θ instead of x, reflects
the fact that the variables are probabilities.3 In this
case, we can simplify the definition of nonnegativity
in (10) as (Lasserre, 2009, Sec.5.4.1):
Σ≥d =
{ ∑
α∈Nn+1
d
,|α|≤d
uαθ
α1
1 · · ·θαnn (1−θ1−·· ·−θn)αn+1 : uα ∈ R≥
}
.
(15)
Note that, the maximum degree of the polynomials in
Σ≥d is d and, therefore, R= d. It is easy to prove the
following.
Proposition 9 Σ≥d satisfies the “pullup” property
for every d ∈ N.
We have also that (12) in this case becomes:
S =
{
L ∈L ∗R | L(1) = 1,
L(θα11 · · ·θαnn (1−θ1−·· ·−θn)αn+1)≥ 0,
∀ α ∈ Nn+1d , |α| ≤ d
}
.
(16)
We recall that the Bernstein (multivariate) polyno-
mials of degree d are:
Bγ,d(θ) =
(
d
γ
)
θγ11 . . .θ
γn
n (1−θ1−·· ·−θn)d−|γ|,
where γ = (γ1, . . . ,γn) with γi ∈N. Moreover, all Bern-
stein polynomials of fixed degree d forms a basis
for the linear space of all polynomials whose degree
is at most d, and they form a partition of unity:∑
γ:|γ|=dBγ,d(θ) = 1. By exploiting these properties,
we can prove the following.
3. Note that, in this case m= n+1 in (8).
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Proposition 10 A polynomial g : Ω→R of degree d
belongs to the cone in (15) iff it belongs to
Σ˜≥d =
{ ∑
α∈Nn+1
d
,|α|=d
uαθ
α1
1 · · ·θαnn (1−θ1−·· ·−θn)αn+1 : uα ∈ R≥
}
.
(17)
For this reason, we call Σ˜≥d (equiv. Σ
≥
d ) the cone of
Bernstein nonnegative polynomials of degree d.4
In general, it holds that
Σ˜≥d ⊂L≥R
that is, there exist nonnegative polynomials that are
not included in Σ˜≥d .
Example 1 We use this counter-example from
(De Cooman et al., 2015)
q(θ) = θ21−θ1θ2 +θ22,
with n= d= 2, which is nonnegative in Ω. Now con-
sider the cone
Σ˜≥2 = {uijk ∈ R≥ : u002(1−θ1−θ2)2 +u011θ2(1−θ1−θ2)
+u020θ22 +u101θ1(1−θ1−θ2) +u110θ1θ2 +u200θ21}
(18)
and an empty G . The lower prevision of q can be
computed as follows:
EB(q) = sup
λ0∈R,uijk∈R≥
λ0
−u002 +u101−u200 + 1 = 0
−2u002 +u011 +u101−u110−1 = 0
2u002−u101 = 0
−u002 +u011−u020 + 1 = 0
2u002−u011 = 0
−λ0−u002 = 0
(19)
where the equality constraints have been obtained by
equating the coefficients of the monomials in
q(θ)−λ0 = u002(1−θ1−θ2)2 +u011θ2(1−θ1−θ2)
+u020θ22 +u101θ1(1−θ1−θ2) +u110θ1θ2 +u200θ21.
The solution of the above LP problem is
[λ0,u002,u011,u020,u101,u110,u200]
= [−0.5, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 1, 0, 1.5],
which means that EB(q) =−0.5< 0. It is easy to verify
that EB(q) < 0 for any d ≥ 2 and, therefore, q does
not belong to Σ≥d for any d. However, Figure 1 shows
4. We could again simplify (16), but we leave the redundant
formulation (16) because it requires to specify L on the
monomials too.
that EB(q) quickly tends to zero at the increase of the
degree d of Σ≥d . Therefore, we can build a hierarchy of
LPs (Lasserre, 2009, Sec.5.4) of increasing size such
that
EB(q)
d→∞−−−−→ E(q).
This is true in general provided that G ∩L<R = ∅.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Degree
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Lo
we
r P
re
vi
sio
n
Lower Prevision
Figure 1: Convergence of EB(q) to E(q) at the increase
of the degree d.
5.2. Updating via partition of unity
LR is a space of polynomials and, therefore, it does
not include indicator functions. That means we cannot
define conditioning. However, we can still update our
beliefs in a weaker way using a partition of unity.
We have seen that the Bernstein polynomials form a
partition of unity, e.g.,
n= 3,d= 1 : {θ1,θ2,θ3,1−θ1−θ2−θ3}, (20)
they are nonnegative functions and sum up to one. We
can then compute an updated lower prevision for a
gamble q as:
EB(q|pi) = sup
λj≥0,λ0
λ0
s.t.
(q−λ0)pi−
|G|∑
j=1
λjgj ∈ Σ≥d ,
(21)
where d must be large enough to guarantee that the
membership problem is well-posed and pi denotes any
subset sum of the partition of unity (in the example in
(20) pi ∈ {θ1,θ2,θ3,1−θ1−θ2−θ3,θ1 +θ2,θ1 +θ3,θ2 +
θ3, . . .}). To alternatively justify this rule, we point out
that pi can be interpreted as a multinomial likelihood5
and the result of (21) as a bounded rationality version
of a regular posterior (Walley, 1991, Appendix J5).
5. The multinomial distribution is used to model the outcome
of ` experiments, where the outcome of each trial has a
categorical distribution, e.g., rolling a k-sided die ` times.
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5.3. A Bell inequality in the Bernstein world
In this section, we derive a Bell’s type inequality in the
Bernstein world: a probabilistic inequality that holds
in T but that is violated in T∗ (Bernstein world). We
will derive it by building a negative polynomial that
has positive prevision in T∗. In the next section, we
will show that the state assigning a positive prevision
to such polynomial is entangled! For this purpose, we
consider two coins, that we denote as l (left) and,
respectively, r (right), and define
θ1
θ2
θ3
1−θ1−θ2−θ3
= Prob

HlHr
TlHr
HlTr
Tl,Tr
 ,
where Hi,Ti denote the outcome Heads and, respec-
tively, Tails for the left or right coin. In this case, the
possibility space is
Ω =
{
θ ∈ R3 : θ1,θ2,θ3 ≥ 0, 1−θ1−θ2−θ3 ≥ 0
}
.
(22)
Note that, the following marginal relationships hold:
θHl = Prob(Hl) = θ1 +θ3, θHr = Prob(Hr) = θ1 +θ2.
Let d be equal to 2 and consider the state:
L(θ1) = z100 = 1/3 L(θ21) = z200 = 1/3
L(θ2) = z010 = 1/6 L(θ22) = z020 = 0
L(θ3) = z001 = 1/6 L(θ23) = z002 = 0
L(θ1θ2) = z110 = 0 L(θ1θ3) = z101 = 0
L(θ2θ3) = z011 = 1/6 L(1) = z000 = 1,
(23)
which belongs to (16).
Now consider the polynomial:
q(θ) =−(θ1 +θ2)2− (θ1 +θ3)(−2θ1−2θ2 + 1)− ,
with  > 0 and observe that q(θ)≤−. The polynomial
is negative! However, its prevision6 EB(q) w.r.t. the
state (23) is equal to
L(q) =−z001 + 2z011−z020−z100 + 2z101 +z200− 
= 16 − ≥ 0.
(24)
Therefore, we have violated an inequality that holds
in classical probability (E(q)≤− in T), although the
set of desirable gambles
C = {g ∈LR | L(g)≥ 0},
with L defined in (23), is logical consistent in T? (P-
coherent). This is the essence of Bell’s type inequalities:
the quantum weirdness which is also present in Bern-
stein’s world.
6. The lower and upper previsions coincide for q.
5.4. Entanglement
We continue the previous example and we set up a
thought experiment that uncovers the entanglement
of the two coins.
Assume two coins are drawn from a bag in the state
(23). We give the left coin to Alice and the right coin
to Bob as depicted in Figure 2.
We will now show that after the coins move apart,
there are “matching” correlations between the output
of their toss. That is a measurement (though a toss)
of the bias of one coin will allow the prediction, with
certainty, of the outcome of the measurement (toss)
on the other coin.
Assume that Alice tosses her coin first and that it
lands Heads, then she can compute her updated pre-
vision (through (21) with pi = θ1 +θ3) for the gamble
q(θ) = θ1 + θ2 (Heads on Bob’s coin). We can easily
do this computation in the dual space.7 Note that
0 = L((q−λ0)pi) =−λ0z001−λ0z100 +z011
+z101 +z110 +z200
has solution λ0 = 1. Alice instantaneously knows that
the result of the toss of Bob’s coin will be Heads.
Similarly, we can consider all the other cases
q = 1−θ1−θ2, pi = θ1 +θ3, λ0 = 0
q = θ1 +θ2, pi = 1−θ1−θ3, λ0 = 0
q = 1−θ1−θ2, pi = 1−θ1−θ3, λ0 = 1.
This means that as soon as Alice sees the result of the
toss of the left coin, she immediately knows that the
result of the toss of Bob’s coin will be the same. The
two coins are totally “correlated”. Classical correlations
can be explained by a common cause, or correlated
“elements of reality” (Einstein et al., 1935). This is not
the case in Bernstein’s world.
In fact, although the marginal operators satisfy
L(θHr ) = L(θ1 +θ2) = z100 +z010 =
1
2 ,
L(θHl) = L(θ1 +θ3) = z100 +z001 =
1
2 ,
L(θ2Hr ) = L((θ1 +θ2)
2) = z200 + 2z110 +z020 =
1
3 ,
L(θ2Hl) : = L((θ1 +θ3)
2) = z200 + 2z101 +z002 =
1
3 ,
(25)
these are the same moments we would get if the
marginal distribution of the two coins is uniform. That
means that if we send an ensemble of coins to Alice
(Bob), and she (he) tosses them, she (he) will experi-
ence Heads half of the times. A classical correlation
7. Since the state (23) is precisely specified, we do not need to
solve any optimisation to compute the posterior prevision.
7
Benavoli Facchini Zaffalon
bag of coins
counter counter
H
T
H
T
Alice Bob
Figure 2: Coin toss experiment in Bernstein’s world.
model that is compatible with these marginal moments
is given by this probabilistic mixture of atomic charges
(Dirac’s deltas):
p(θ) = 12δ


1
6 (3−
√
3)
0
0
1
6 (3 +
√
3)


(θ)+ 12δ


1
6 (3 +
√
3)
0
0
1
6 (3−
√
3)


(θ).
However, this probabilistic model (or any other) can
never satisfy the moment constraints (23) or, equiv-
alently, can never violate the Bell’s type inequality
presented in the previous section. We have entangle-
ment!
6. Conclusions
In this work, after a brief description and analysis
of the structural properties of P-coherent models, we
have shown that the space of Bernstein polynomials
in which nonnegativity is specified by the Krivine-
Vasilescu certificate is yet another instance of this
theory and that therefore it is possible to construct
in it a thought experiment uncovering entanglement
with classical (hence non quantum) coins.
As a final side remark, we believe that formulating
the theory of desirable gambles directly as a logic sys-
tem provides an elegant way for extending the frame-
work to the accept-reject one but also for merging the
latter with the theory of choice functions.
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Appendix A. Technicalities
A.1. Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1. The equivalence
clposi(G ) = CnT(G ) holds since in the deriva-
tion tree of a sequent G Bg, applications of the closure
rule can be lifted up to the root and joint in a single
inference step. The other equivalence traces back to
Walley (1991). 
A.2. Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5. As for T, the equiva-
lence clposi(G ) = CnT?(G ) holds since in the deriva-
tion tree of a sequent G Bg, applications of the closure
rule can be lifted up to the root and joint in a single
inference step.
Next, for the equivalence between items (1)-(3), first
of all, notice that posi(G ∪Σ≥) ⊆ clposi(G ∪Σ≥) ⊆
CnT?(G ). Hence, (3) implies (2) implies (1). For the
remaining implications we reason as follows. Assume
that (2) holds, and assume f + δ ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥), for
every δ > 0. This means f ∈ cl(posi(G ∪Σ≥)). Sup-
pose f ∈ Σ<, then since Σ< is open, f + δ ∈ Σ< for
some δ > 0, contradicting P-coherence of posi(G ∪Σ≥).
We therefore conclude that f /∈ Σ<, and that (3)
holds. Now, assume (2) does not hold, i.e. f ∈ Σ<
and f ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥). Hence, −f is in the interior of
Σ≥, meaning that for some δ > 0, −f − δ = g ∈ Σ≥.
From this we get that −1 = g+fδ ∈ posi(G ∪Σ≥): (1)
does not hold. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Since (1) always im-
plies (2), we need to verify the other direction. As-
sume CnT?(G ) is not P-coherent. By Proposition 5,
−1∈CnT?(G ), and thus −∈CnT?(G ), for every ≥ 0.
Let f ∈ LR. If (*) holds there is  > 0 such that
f +  ∈ Σ≥ ⊆ CnT?(G ). Hence, by closure under linear
combinations, f + + (−) = f ∈ CnT?(G ).
Assume (b) holds. It is enough to prove that
−B ⊆ posi(B ∪ {−1}). Fix b ∈ B. By hypothesis
−1 b−
∑`
i=1λibi = −1, with λi ≥ 0 and  > 0, for
some {b1, . . . , b`}⊆B. Hence −b= (−1+
∑`
i=1λibi)∈
posi(B∪{−1}). We thus conclude that CnT?(G ) is log-
ical inconsistent. 
In the next Proposition we explicit another property
of Σ≥ and verify that implies (*).
Proposition 11 Assume that Σ≥ contains a basis B
ofLR and for every b∈B there is a finite {b1, . . . , b`}⊂
B such that b+
∑`
i=1λibi =  > 0, with λi ≥ 0. Then
condition (*) holds
Proof It is enough to check that, for b ∈ B, there
is  > 0 such that −b+  ∈ Σ≥. But this is immedi-
ate since by hypothesis we know there is a finite
{b1, . . . , b`} ⊂B such that b+
∑`
i=1λibi =  > 0, with
λi ≥ 0. Hence −b+  =
∑`
i=1λibi, which is in Σ≥
since the latter is a cone that includes B.
Proof of Proposition 9. This follows by Propo-
sition 11 and the fact that Bernstein’s polynomials
form a partition of unity. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Assume that a polyno-
mial f(θ) belongs to (15). If there exists a monomial
of f(θ) of degree ` less than d, then we can multiply
it for the Bernstein partition of unity of degree d− `.
The resulting polynomial will then belong to (17). The
opposite direction of the proof is obvious. 
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